Proxy war: The Anglo-Egyptian confrontation in South Arabia, 1955–1964

In the history of rivalry between regional and extra-regional players in South Arabia, the relationship between the United Kingdom and Egypt holds a special place. In the 1960s, the Anglo-Egyptian struggle acquired a qualitatively new dimension against the backdrop of the Yemeni civil war, providing one of the first examples of the socalled proxy wars in the Middle East. The first section of the article considers the origins of the Anglo-Egyptian rivalry in the region and identifies its immediate participants, namely, the Kingdom of Yemen, independent from Great Britain, the British protectorates of the Arabian Peninsula, and the Crown Colony of Aden. The author notes that after G.A. Nasser, a major proponent of the pan-Arabism ideology, came to power in Egypt, it became particularly challenging for Britain to maintain its position in the region. The second section examines the British elites’ conflicting attitudes and approaches to responding to the rise of Arab nationalism in South Arabia after the failure of the Suez operation. On the one hand, the United Kingdom was unprepared to engage in full-scale military operations in the region, which was fraught with the risk of a complete loss of its authority in the Arab world. On the other hand, British politicians were obsessed with suspicions regarding Nasser’s expansionist plans and sought to demonstrate him and the world their readiness to protect their interests. The author shows that between 1956 and 1958 the United Kingdom confined itself to organizing raids by tribes loyal to the British Crown, into the Kingdom of Yemen and delivering surgical strikes in areas controlled by its protectorates. The third section traces the evolution of the British approach to military engagement in South Arabia: from localized ‘retaliatory strikes’ to a sort of hybrid warfare with Egypt in the territory of the Yemeni Republic, proclaimed in 1962. The author notes that Harold Macmillan’s cabinet was pushed toward stronger support for Yemeni royalists not only by rapidly unfolding regional developments and the growing fervor of Arab nationalists but also by mounting criticism of the Conservative Party’s policies from within–namely, the ‘Aden Group’ and the opposition. The article concludes that the shift to proxy warfare tactics was a deliberate step by the British leadership, shaped by both the lessons of the Suez debacle and the inertia of imperial thinking. Although this tactic did not allow the United Kingdom to retain access to Aden or resolve the Yemeni conflict in its favor, the experience of proxy warfare in South Arabia remains relevant even in the 21st century.