Under China’s “Rural Revitalisation” strategy, contract farming faces challenges including farmers’ limited access to advanced technologies and high operational risks for agricultural support enterprises. The collaborative involvement of scientific research institutions offers potential solutions but remains underexplored. This study employs Stackelberg game theory to model a contract farming supply chain under two agricultural assistance modes: enterprise-led (EL) and collaborative assistance with scientific research institutions (CI). We further propose two government subsidy mechanisms: subsidies to enterprises and subsidies to scientific research institutions. The models analyze optimal decisions, supply chain performance, and subsidy efficiency, validated through numerical experiments. Key findings reveal the following: (1) The CI mode enhances agricultural output and farmer revenue but may reduce enterprise profits, deterring collaboration. (2) Government subsidies incentivize enterprise–institution collaboration. Subsidizing scientific research institutions typically improves agricultural productivity and economic benefits more effectively than subsidizing enterprises. (3) Synergistic effects exist among the government subsidy coefficient, cost coefficient of technical assistance, consumer preferences for agricultural quality, and profit-sharing ratio. The latter three parameters significantly influence subsidy model selection. This research provides policy insights for enhancing agricultural assistance efficiency and sustainable contract farming development.
Zhang et al. (Tue,) studied this question.