The phenomenon of asymmetry of institutional transformations is one of relatively under-researched issues in the contemporary Political Science. The latest round of municipal reform in Russia (2020—2025) has provided new opportunities to examine this topic using the case of asymmetric centralization. Despite the initial plan to unify all subjects of the Russian Federation under a single-tier model of municipal governance, the reform’s outcome has turned out to be less uniform, and several regions have retained the two-tier system. This article attempts to identify the cause of this variation by testing the existing approaches to explaining the logic of asymmetric centralization via statistical analysis. The analysis has not confirmed the economic explanation for the varying outcomes of municipal governance reforms in the Russian regions, but has shown the relevance of the political interpretations. The political strength of governors and the level of electoral loyalty serve as significant predictors of the region’s ability to block the reform and keep the two-tier model of municipal governance. In broader terms, the results indicate that the electoral processes continue to play a significant role and influence the dynamics of political development, even under the conditions of high centralization of the political system and elite consolidation. According to the author’s conclusion, the case of municipal reforms in Russia demonstrates that, within the context of electoral authoritarianism, elections do not only replicate the specific dynamics of inter-elite rivalry, but also have a more extensive impact, imposing political constraints on centralization.
Stanislav Shkel (Wed,) studied this question.