This paper, focusing on information cooperation through joint information management systems and information‑sharing cooperative bodies, examines the constitutional requirements under German Basic Law for lawful intelligence-investigative agency cooperation and how these can inform Korean legislation. In Germany, the principle of information separation prevents abuse of power and protects fundamental rights, yet close cooperation is necessary against terrorism and cross‑border crime. Information exchange occurs either through traditional bilateral transfers or special mechanisms such as the Anti‑Terror Database (ATD), the Right‑Wing Extremism Database (RED-D), and various joint centers. For integrated information systems such as the Anti-Terror Database (ATD), these systems operate based on dedicated statutory laws and maintain the separation principle by distinguishing between basic and extended data, with access to extended data requiring approval from the agency that stores the information. Joint centers such as the GTAZ, GETZ, GIZ, and Cyber‑AZ function as cooperation platforms without independent statutory foundations, strictly separating the networks of police and intelligence agencies and having each agency exchange data only in accordance with its own legal authority. The German model suggests that, if Korea develops integrated systems, statutory provisions must clearly authorize them, maintain information separation, and set differentiated transfer conditions based on agency type and data sensitivity. Existing bodies like the NCSC, NCIC, and TIIC should be updated to meet these standards, balancing rights protection with effective security cooperation.
Kong Jinseong (Sun,) studied this question.