Spontaneous Formation of Evolutionary Game Strategies for Long-Term Carbon Emission Reduction Based on Low-Carbon Trading Mechanism

In the context of increasing global efforts to mitigate climate change, effective carbon emission reduction is a pressing issue. Governments and power companies are key stakeholders in implementing low-carbon strategies, but their interactions require careful management to ensure optimal outcomes for both economic development and environmental protection. This paper addresses this real-world challenge by utilizing evolutionary game theory (EGT) to model the strategic interactions between these stakeholders under a low-carbon trading mechanism. Unlike classical game theory, which assumes complete rationality and perfect information, EGT allows for bounded rationality and learning over time, making it particularly suitable for modeling long-term interactions in complex systems like carbon markets. This study builds an evolutionary game model between the government and power companies to explore how different strategies in carbon emission reduction evolve over time. Using payoff matrices and replicator dynamics equations, we determine the evolutionarily stable equilibrium (ESE) points and analyze their stability through dynamic simulations. The findings show that in the absence of a third-party regulator, neither party achieves an ideal ESE. To address this, a third-party regulatory body is introduced into the model, leading to the formulation of a tripartite evolutionary game. The results highlight the importance of regulatory oversight in achieving stable and optimal low-carbon strategies. This paper offers practical policy recommendations based on the simulation outcomes, providing a robust theoretical framework for government intervention in carbon markets and guiding enterprises towards sustainable practices.