Bentham, Iser, and the Necessity of Fiction

Despite the intense reception and critical discussion which Wolfgang Iser's work on the reading process and the esthetics of reception (Rezeptionsästhetik) received throughout the 1970s and 80s in Anglo-American literary criticism, his later ambitious attempt to sketch out a "literary anthropology" with the help of a general theory of fiction was almost completely ignored outside of his immediate German context. This is especially lamentable from the perspective of law and literature approaches to legal and literary fiction since Iser's argument for the anthropological "grounding" of fictions as acts of motivated and strategic "feigning" (fingieren) develops out of a careful analysis and assessment of Jeremy Bentham's Theory of Fiction. Iser's discussion of Bentham does not only present a rare case of acknowledgement of Benthamian notions about fictions from the perspective of continental literary theory, it also illustrates the way in which the discussion of fiction in general may serve to foster a more robust interdisciplinary perspective in regard to legal and literary practices of storytelling and narration.Footnote1 Since Iser's theory of (literary) fiction has been perceived from rather different angles and with a diverging range of comprehension by Anglo-American and European audiences, respectively, the essay will first attempt to introduce and place Iser's discussion of fiction and the imaginary within the larger disciplinary context and his overarching interest and investment in a literary anthropology. After a more general presentation of the various elements in his larger work, the paper will briefly look at the "anthropological" prospects which Iser had pursued from early on throughout his critical work, culminating in The Fictive and the Imaginary. The second half of the essay will then take a closer look at Iser's particular interest in and detailed discussion of Jeremy Bentham's Theory of Fiction, to reveal how Iser's own anthropological project could derive a central impulse and trajectory from his intense reading of Bentham. In particular, I am interested in how Iser interprets Bentham's use of legal fictions to project a general theory of fiction, and how Iser then uses the concept of necessity or "need" to gradually translate and transfer Bentham's theoretical premises to match and support his own conceptualization of the fictive, the real and the imaginary. Iser's particular understanding of "doing fiction," I will conclude, might be of considerable value for the interdisciplinary engagement with legal and literary fictions.