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The authentication process in fifth-generation networks between the user equipment and the network relies on secure communication protocols, with the 5G authentication and key agreement (5G-AKA) being a prominent one. However, this protocol still has shortcomings, as identified in the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) release, which poses vulnerabilities. Notably, a primary concern is the insufficient protection of user privacy. This deficiency allows attackers to potentially exploit weaknesses in encryption, signing, and update mechanisms, leading to the tracking of a user's identity, location, and activities. Furthermore, the 5G -AKA protocol is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, in which malicious actors can assume the identity of service providers or networks, leading to the interruption of communication between users and servers. Additionally, the protocol lacks robustness in guaranteeing mutual authentication, enabling attackers to forge authentication messages and manipulate user data. In this paper, we propose a key generation method based on the concept of post-quantum cryptography to provide robust resistance to attacks. Furthermore, we propose a key exchange method that authenticates the user's equipment and home network through the application of Kyber, where both parties possess pre-established static public keys. The proposal provides identity protection, non-traceability, mutual authentication, and confidentiality. We implement this protocol to test 5G-AKA's vulnerabilities and analyse its effectiveness against specific attacks. The experiment used Minnet simulation and Ryu controllers to implement 5G-AKA with standard-specified characteristics.
Joudah et al. (Mon,) studied this question.