The Philippine Presidency and Middle-Power Agency

The Philippine Presidency and Middle-Power Agency Charmaine Misalucha-Willoughby (bio) Based on its geographic proximity, coupled with its economic, demographic, military, and diplomatic weight, the Philippines is a middle power that—in theory—ought to have the agency to influence tensions in the Taiwan Strait. The Lowy Institute's Asia Power Index, for instance, ranked the Philippines 16th out of 26 Asian countries for comprehensive power in 2023.1 Other regional countries in this middle range included Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and Vietnam. However, the Philippines has not yet articulated a vision emphasizing its middle-power status, and prudence is required regarding any role it could play in a cross-strait conflict.2 Drawing on the last two administrations of President Rodrigo Duterte (2016–22) and President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. (incumbent since 2022) as case studies, this essay argues that while the Philippines potentially has agency vis-à-vis a Taiwan contingency, whether this agency is exercised remains highly context specific. The essay begins by first canvassing the geopolitical risks the Philippines must consider, followed by an analysis of how the Duterte and Marcos administrations have exercised agency in relation to these risks. Understanding the dynamics of these varying contexts, in turn, has policy implications for the Philippines' role in preventing a military conflict over Taiwan. The Philippines' Risk Assessment At least four factors presently loom large on Manila's geopolitical radar. The first is the U.S.-China strategic competition. The hardening of U.S. political and strategic attitudes across the board—compounded by the fact that 2024 is a U.S. presidential election year—makes it increasingly difficult End Page 57 for Washington to shift the deepening Sino-U.S. rivalry back toward even a modicum of cooperation. Meanwhile, China is confronting challenging domestic dynamics. The most urgent task for President Xi Jinping, who is now in an unprecedented third term, is to stabilize and rebuild the Chinese economy. Two years of strict zero-Covid policies severely disrupted China's economy, as evidenced by a sharp drop in consumer spending, business investment, and exports, while also halting growth in the real estate sector. These dynamics place the Philippines—as well as most other Asian middle powers—in an increasingly precarious position between China, its leading trading partner, and the United States, its long-standing security ally. A second factor on Manila's list of strategic priorities is China's continued presence in the South China Sea. This is not a new challenge for the Philippines, which has been grappling with China's so-called gray-zone tactics since the mid-1990s when Beijing erected structures on Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands. Yet China's use of such tactics has intensified since the mid-2010s, especially following the July 2016 decision in favor of the Philippines by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. The case was initiated by the Philippines and found China's South China Sea policies and behaviors to be illegal. Chinese coercive measures within Philippine waters during this period can be categorized as either militarized or nonmilitarized. Militarized activities involve the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) and its maritime militia using methods that range from shadowing and swarming to outright dangerous vessel maneuvers. Nonmilitarized tactics utilize official diplomatic measures and information manipulation. In the past year, Beijing has further intensified its coercive measures in the West Philippine Sea (the Philippines' official name for the parts of the South China Sea within its exclusive economic zone, or EEZ). The CCG and maritime militia continue to use dangerous maneuvers to block and harass Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and Philippine military vessels from conducting resupply missions to the BRP Sierra Madre in Ayungin Shoal. A small team of Philippine marines is stationed on the BRP Sierra Madre, a grounded ship from World War II that serves as a Philippine outpost in the West Philippine Sea. China continues to bolster its militarized coercive maneuvers with political and diplomatic measures as well. In the past, the Chinese Communist Party used a historically based "nine-dash line" to illustrate the country's claim to South China Sea. The nine dashes delineated approximately 90% of the sea and...