Strengthening As Well As Weakening: The Contradicting Roles of Islam in Indonesian Democracy

Strengthening As Well As Weakening:The Contradicting Roles of Islam in Indonesian Democracy Djayadi Hanan (bio) In Unity through Division: Political Islam, Representation and Democracy in Indonesia, Diego Fossati argues that political Islam is deeply rooted in Indonesian politics, making it always relevant from the colonial era through today's democratic era. Political Islam as a political ideology derives from clear differences among Indonesians on the role of or relationship between Islam and politics, resulting in a spectrum that positions the Islamist camp (those who would like a greater or dominant role for Islam) at one end and the pluralist camp (those who support a lesser role for Islam or no role for it in politics) at the other. In between the two camps lie the centrists. Fossati begins the book with a puzzle about why, during an era of democratic deterioration starting in the mid-2010s, Indonesians' satisfaction with democratic practice is unexpectedly increasing. By carefully looking at the relationship between political Islam and political representation, he finds this increase is related to the increase in democratic satisfaction among Islamists because they feel that they are more represented in this period of democratic decline. By using impressive data (both in volume and quality) and sophisticated analysis, the author makes a convincing argument about the relevance of ideology and political Islam in Indonesian democracy. However, it seems to me that the author does not provide a direct answer to the question of why democratic satisfaction is increasing during a time of democratic backsliding. My answer to this question is mainly based on my understanding of a possible implication of the author's main argument. One clue is where the author writes "the cleavage over political Islam is related to satisfaction with democracy, as on average, Islamist individuals tend to be more satisfied with democracy than pluralists" (p. 17). Another clue is in chapter 7 where Fossati argues that satisfaction with democracy is correlated positively with a participatory conception of democracy to which Islamists tend to adhere. End Page 218 If my understanding is right, there are still questions that need to be answered or explained. To what extent does this contribution of Islamists to democratic satisfaction matter at the aggregate level? Does it mean that the level of satisfaction is low among the pluralists and centrists but very high among the Islamists, resulting in the overall increase in the level of satisfaction? How do we know that? In my view, one of the ways to look at this is by categorizing the level of satisfaction among the Islamic party voters—Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP), Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS), Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB), and Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)—and the secular party voters—Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP), Gerindra, Golkar, NasDem, and Demokrat. Based on the Political Islam Index, the Islamists' ideology tends to be in line with the Islamic parties (chapter 6). Therefore, we should expect that the level of democratic satisfaction among voters for Islamic parties should be much higher than those for secular parties. Because democratic backsliding continues through the present, this expectation should also be confirmed after 2019, which is when the author's data ends. However, the data that I can access from the national surveys of the Lembaga Survei Indonesia (Indonesian Survey Institute, LSI) between early February 2019 and February 2024, for instance, does not confirm this expectation. Based on six national surveys in February 2019, February 2020 (before Covid-19), January 2021, August 2022, August 2023, and February 2024, the levels of democratic satisfaction of Islamic party voters have always been lower than secular party voters. Consecutively, Islamic parties' voters' satisfaction is 70%, 73%, 63%, 72%, 69%, and 67%. Meanwhile, secular parties' voters' satisfaction is always higher at the levels of 71%, 81%, 78%, 80%, 74%, and 74%.1 Looking at this data, we see that Islamists (at least those who vote for Islamic parties) tend to have a lower level of satisfaction with Indonesia's democracy. Similarly, their dissatisfaction, based on these six national surveys, has always been higher than that of voters for secular parties. Can the author claim that the increase in democratic satisfaction during a period of democratic backsliding is...