This article examines the relationship between natural language and causal cognition and argues that linguistic structures both reflect and constrain the ways in which humans conceptualize and represent causation. It opens with a survey of foundational philosophical theories of causation, focusing on the tension between metaphysical accounts and judgment-based approaches. The discussion then turns to a range of linguistic phenomena—including causative constructions, conditional sentences, discourse coherence, aspectual interpretation, and argument structure—demonstrating how causal relations are systematically encoded across grammatical domains. Building on insights from linguistics, philosophy, and cognitive science, the article reviews recent developments of a semantic framework for modeling causal knowledge in language. Rather than assuming a uniform mapping between causal relations and their linguistic expressions, the framework accounts for systematic variation in how causality is selected, structured, and communicated. In doing so, it positions natural language as a key source of evidence for understanding the architecture of causal reasoning and its representation in human cognition.
Elitzur A. Bar-Asher Siegal (Wed,) studied this question.