Abstract: This paper analyzes the role of language and the concept of pramāṇa (valid means of knowledge) within Buddhist epistemology. The central theme of Indian philosophy, including Buddhism, is the investigation of pramāṇas as instruments for attaining accurate knowledge (pramā). While various Indian schools accept up to six pramāṇas, Buddhist logico-epistemology, notably the Dignāga and Dharmakīrti schools, exclusively recognize two: Pratyakṣa (Perception) and Anumāna (Inference). They view others like comparison and testimony as subsumed under inference. Furthermore, the Buddhist tradition accepts scriptural authority only if it is consistent with perception and inference, aligning with the Buddha’s injunction against accepting anything based on mere tradition. Pratyakṣa (Perception) is defined as direct, immediate, and non-conceptual experience of reality. It is considered valid because it apprehends the uniqueness (svalakṣaṇa) of an object, unassociated with language or conceptual construction (kalpana). Anumāna (Inference) is the secondary means of knowledge, relying on reasoning and logical analysis. It is based on vyāpti (invariable concomitance) between a hetu (reason) and a sādhya (inferable property). Inference is categorized into Svārthānumānam (for oneself) and Parārthānumānam (for others, often stated in syllogistic form). Different Buddhist schools like Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka offer varied theories on the nature and limitation of perception and inference, particularly concerning the role of consciousness, momentariness, and emptiness (śūnyatā). The paper concludes that Buddhist epistemologists utilize these tools to accurately “measure reality” and advance the path to liberation.
Chitra Bhaskar (Wed,) studied this question.