Generally, abstract concepts refer to aspects that point to subjective and introspective characteristics. A concept is considered abstract when it has no direct physical counterpart and refers to properties that emerge from individual experience. The mind is often considered an abstract entity because it is not directly observable in the way a material object is. This has given rise to the mind-body problem and the difficulty of reconciling the materialistic nature of the world with the immaterial nature of mental phenomena. In this sense, the thesis put forward here is close to a form of naturalistic monism, according to which mental states are bodily and neurophysiological processes, but their apparent otherness arises from a historically stratified linguistic categorization. The aim of this article is to explore the idea that the mind-body problem is not due to an ontological separation between the material and the immaterial, but rather a linguistic and epistemological problem. This work is divided into three sections: the first section outlines the main philosophical perspectives that have been proposed to answer the mind-body problem, providing a framework for understanding it. The second section explores Friedland’s linguistic-epistemological proposal in depth. Finally, in the third part, this theory is integrated with studies on neurophysiology and interoception, in order to propose a model that integrates language, body and consciousness and overcomes Cartesian dualism.
Re et al. (Tue,) studied this question.