This article examines the phenomenon of overcompliance with European Union (EU) sanctions, particularly in the context of measures imposed in response to Russia’s war against Ukraine. Overcompliance occurs when companies and individuals exceed the legal requirements of sanctions, often due to regulatory uncertainty, broad and ambiguous legal provisions, overlapping responsibilities, ethical considerations, and external pressures such as public opinion. The article situates EU sanctions within both foreign policy and domestic regulatory frameworks, highlighting the dual expectation placed on EU companies: to further geopolitical objectives while independently interpreting and implementing complex regulations in daily operations. The lack of precise, binding guidance from EU authorities compels companies to calibrate their own compliance measures, leading to a cautious approach that can blur the line between compliance and overcompliance. The article argues that overcompliance is not merely an anomaly but also an inherent feature of the EU sanctions regime, reinforced by the “obligation of result” approach. To navigate this landscape, companies are encouraged to take proactive ownership of their compliance processes – assessing, documenting, and communicating their roles and responsibilities, and engaging with other stakeholders to clarify expectations. Ultimately, effective sanctions implementation depends on informed, calibrated, and collaborative compliance strategies that balance the risks of both overcompliance and non-compliance, with the overarching aim of securing the sought-after middle ground.
Frederik van Essen (Mon,) studied this question.