The paper examines Sextus’ concept of Pyrrhonian Scepticism, as presented in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Πυρρώνειοι ὑποτυπώσεις). Contemporary scholarship is in disagreement as to the appropriate meaning of Sextus’ work: whether the Sceptic suspends judgement on all issues, or whether he may hold some justified beliefs and act intentionally upon them. Proponents of the strong (so-called rustic) interpretation maintain that the Sceptic suspends judgement on all beliefs, whereas the more moderate (urban) view holds that the Pyrrhonian is capable of intentional action and that he lives an ordinary life, while suspending judgement only with respect to the scientific and philosophical beliefs of the dogmatists. For Sextus, it was essential to present the goal (τέλος) of the Sceptical school, which concerns both questions examined in philosophy and those of everyday life. The study proposes an argumentation scheme of Pyrrhonian Scepticism that adheres to Sextus’ account in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism and from which it is clear that the Pyrrhonian suspension of judgement (ἐποχή) does not concern matters of ordinary life, so that there is no reason to think that the Sceptic is unable to act intentionally and to live the same way an ordinary person does.
Grigoris Vasiliadis (Mon,) studied this question.