Within closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs), limited attention has been given to firms’ production and abatement decisions involving carbon permit transfer between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and an independent remanufacturer (IR) under a cap-and-trade policy (CTP). Several questions remain unresolved: How does CTP reshape production and abatement decisions through carbon permit transfer under binding emission constraints? Can such regulation reallocate abatement responsibilities between firms and generate environmental and economic benefits? To address these questions, this paper develops a constrained Cournot game model capturing competitive interactions between an OEM and an IR under regulation. The results show that CTP reallocates abatement responsibilities toward the firm with a lower abatement difficulty, inducing full abatement as a corner solution. When remanufactured products exhibit a high low-carbon level, a moderate increase in cap stringency promotes remanufacturing output and market share. By contrast, once full abatement is reached, stricter regulation expands output. Moreover, when remanufacturing features substantial cost savings and a high low-carbon level, CTP consistently improves social welfare. This study provides insights into how cap-and-trade policies shape production and abatement decisions in CLSCs.
Bian et al. (Fri,) studied this question.