Process metaphysics seeks to provide a novel foundation for metaphysical explanations of entities in both scientific inquiry and everyday experience. It aims to better explain ongoing phenomena—moving, raining, and the like—by analysing them as fundamental processes (FP), that is, dynamic entities not further reducible. Crucially, I argue, this analysis and the ultimate value of process metaphysical explanation hinge on an understanding of what dynamicity is; without one, the central thesis concerning fundamental processes remains vacuous. The paper examines metametaphysically what an account of dynamicity should provide, defending three desiderata: (1) difference-making: it must draw an informative, not merely stipulative, distinction between dynamic and static entities; (2) explanatory power: it must provide the conceptual resources to yield explanatory claims about dynamic entities and apply broadly. On the basis of these desiderata, I argue that prominent accounts of dynamicity, that is the mereological and modal account, prove unsatisfactory or miss their mark. The paper concludes by developing and defending an account of dynamicity as temporal forward-directedness, thereby linking process metaphysics to realist theories of time.
Maximilian Zachrau (Fri,) studied this question.