G. A. Cohen’s Principle of Labour Justice: Equality of Work and Income Protects Occupational Interests and Avoids the Freedom Objection

This paper identifies and examines what I argue is Cohen’s real principle of egalitarian labour justice, Equality of Work and Income. The argument turns on two often underappreciated aspects of Cohen’s view: the fundamental, fact-free level of reasoning that Cohen thinks is the correct level for inquiring into the fundamental nature of values and principles, and the fact that Cohen includes job satisfaction in the metric of equality, and thereby effectively protects the same occupational interests that freedom of occupational choice is there to protect. I argue that therefore, the familiar freedom objection to Cohen’s egalitarianism fails to get off the ground. This also means that no egalitarian ethos is needed to respond to it. Rather, the real difficulties for the principle of Equality of Work and Income are the same as the familiar challenges to equality of welfare. The paper thus aims to re-rescue Cohen’s egalitarianism from the debate on the freedom objection, but also to clarify the real challenges for Cohen’s view, and the real significance of the egalitarian ethos.