LLMs have been shown to induce representations akin to real-world information structures. According to the standard account, this is because LLMs model the human mind, and minds model the world. Thus, LLMs and minds share properties that ultimately converge upon similar structures. We contribute to this discourse in two ways: a) We argue for an alternative account: LLMs model minds, and minds model worlds, but minds also model LLMs, which in turn extend the capacities of minds. In sum, the world-mind-LLM system constitutes a three-player game, which b) we show does not necessarily converge. We explore the epistemological consequences of non-convergence for world-mind-model systems, introducing the concept of epistemic drift. We offer a new explanatory account of epistemic drift as a social phenomenon, and explore the potential safety concerns of epistemic drift with the introduction of LLMs. Finally, we contribute to existing discourse surrounding LLM agency, arguing that agency is not found in the content of LLM output, but in the way they functionally interact with minds.
Søgaard et al. (Fri,) studied this question.