This study analyzes the conflicts and internal fissures surrounding the Olympics during the Cold War, focusing on China’s strategic responses to the 1980 Moscow and 1984 Los Angeles Olympic boycotts. It highlights the fact that China, despite its membership in the socialist bloc, joined the U.S.-led boycott of the Moscow Olympics and subsequently refused to participate in the Soviet-led boycott of the LA Olympics. This paper argues that China’s strategy was not the result of a linear judgment or based on Cold War ideological bloc logic; rather, it was a product of strategic calculations that prioritized its relationship with the United States. Through this analysis, the study demonstrates that international conflicts during the Cold War were multi-layered and complex, manifesting intensely not only in political and diplomatic spheres but also in the “non-political” arena of sports. Ultimately, the strategies adopted by China regarding these two boycotts in the early 1980s suggest that the borders of the Cold War were collapsing from within. By doing so, this research contributes an intriguing new case study to the existing literature. This process, in turn, raises fundamental questions about the actual substantive meaning and role of ideology during the Cold War era.
Sukjin Park (Sat,) studied this question.