In this essay, I examine, from a primarily philosophical perspective, Menasseh’s views on human freedom, and especially freedom of the will, as these emerge in De Termino Vitae and other writings by the celebrated Amsterdam rabbi, teacher, author and printer. In light of Maimonides’ historical importance on this question (as on other philosophical topics), especially for the Sephardic Jews of Amsterdam in the seventeenth century, a comparison of Menasseh’s account with that of his illustrious twelfth-century forebear contributes to illuminating both the consistency and possible pedigree of that account, as well as its easily overlooked complexity. Moreover, the account shared, with some differences of detail, by Menasseh and Maimonides has as good a license as any to count as at least an authoritative ‘Jewish’ view, something that Beverwijck wanted so badly to know.
Steven Nadler (Mon,) studied this question.