Evolutionary Game Analysis of Cross-Border Logistics Service Quality Management from the Perspective of Multi-Agent Participation

To enhance cross-border logistics service quality and build a trustworthy and transparent service ecosystem, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving cross-border logistics enterprises, governments, and consumers. Considering operational reliability and information transparency, this paper explores the strategic interactions among stakeholders and the sensitivity of key influencing factors through evolutionary stable strategy analysis and numerical simulation. The results indicate four typical evolutionary scenarios: regulatory silos, feedback failure, administrative dominance, and collaborative governance. The government’s willingness to regulate is positively correlated with the service quality provided by logistics enterprises. Positive consumer feedback strengthens social supervision and exerts a substitution effect on government regulation. Improving operational reliability reduces enterprises compliance costs, driving improvements in logistics service quality. Information transparency can increase the implicit costs of low-quality service providers by empowering consumers’ feedback. While simple reward–punishment mechanisms or consumer compensation may generate short-term benefits, they may weaken the governance effectiveness of other stakeholders, potentially inducing regulatory inertia or false feedback.