The Impact of Bicameral Incongruence on the Legislative Productivity

This paper examines the effect of bicameral incongruence on the legislative productivity of US state legislatures. While previous studies point out the effect of partisanship, committees, governors and socio-economic conditions on legislative activities, the impact of bicameralism is rarely examined. The central claim of this paper is that ideological incongruence between the lower and upper chambers reduces legislative outcomes in U.S. state bicameral legislatures. For this purpose, I empirically analyze how the ideological compositions of the two chambers have effects on the enacted legislations of US state legislatures from 1993 to 2011. In terms of methodology, I calculate the degree of bicameral incongruence of each state by using the state legislator Shor-McCarty ideology data. My main finding is that greater ideological difference between the lower and upper chambers decreases the law productivity of US state legislatures. In addition, I also consider the effects of party polarization and internal cohesion on law production at the state level. Finally, I conclude that the ideological composition of the both chambers signicantly inuences the law production of US state legislatures.