In many economic systems, value tends to be attributed to visible final outcomes rather than to the cumulative processes of reference, improvement, and adaptation that make those outcomes possible. This paper documents a Recurring Capture Pattern (RCP) observed in non-rival resource evaluation systems (e.g. knowledge, design, and intellectual asset systems). Under the institutional condition of evaluation structures centered on observable final outcomes and attribution-certainty designs based on exclusive control, individually rational behavior systematically converges not toward reference-circulation-based value amplification, but toward securing outcome attribution and exclusive control. As these behaviors accumulate, they alter the operational conditions of the system itself, resulting in the institutional invisibilization of reference acts, improvement acts, and mapping acts, and reinforcing the same behavioral convergence through a recursive institutional feedback loop. The pattern ultimately produces the structural suppression of value amplification processes in non-rival resources, indicating a structural misalignment between institutional objectives and rational behavioral adaptation. This paper analytically describes the structural relationship between institutional design and rational behavioral adaptation. The document does not propose policy implementation, funding structures, allocation ratios, or normative policy evaluation, but instead presents design principles and operational modules as analytical references for institutional design.
Hiromi Shimamoto (Thu,) studied this question.