This paper reconstructs and interprets the Taliban's rise, fall, and return to power from the movement's emergence in the early 1990s to the collapse of the Afghan Republic in August 2021. The central argument is that the Taliban's endurance cannot be explained through battlefield dynamics alone. The movement survived and eventually prevailed because it learned how to turn Afghanistan's recurring governance failures into political leverage. It combined coercive authority with locally legible dispute resolution, and it benefited from cross-border sanctuary and transnational financing networks that reduced the costs of organizational regeneration. At the same time, the United States-led intervention failed not because it lacked resources, but because it repeatedly substituted external scaffolding for domestic legitimacy. It empowered predatory local brokers, expanded security forces far faster than their institutional foundations could support, and pursued negotiations that ultimately weakened the republic's claim to sovereignty rather than reinforcing it. Using major scholarly histories, government oversight investigations, and international reporting on Afghanistan's political economy, this study traces how these interacting factors produced strategic drift, eroded morale across the Afghan security forces, and enabled a rapid cascade of surrenders in 2021. The argument is not that collapse was inevitable. It is that the structural choices made across two decades made collapse increasingly difficult to avoid once external support was withdrawn.
Ramish Sangi (Mon,) studied this question.