The Labelling Theory of Mental Illness

T his paper will present an evaluation of the labelling theory of mental illness. To this date, there have been three critiques of labelling theory, those by Gove (1970a), Gibbs (1972), and Davis (1972). Gibbs and Davis, for the most part, evaluate formal aspects of the theory; Gove evaluates its substance. Gibbs suggests that the labelling approach is not really a scientific theory, in that it is not sufficiently explicit and unambiguous. Davis proposes that there are ideological biases in the labelling approach, and points to other approaches as alternatives. 1 Although the papers by Gibbs and by Davis raise important questions, neither considers at length the most fundamental question that can be asked about a theory: how well is it supported by empirical studies? Gove considers this question in his critique, and the present paper is devoted to it. In the first section of this paper, I will respond to Gove's evaluation, and in the second, present my own. First, however, I wish to comment on Gibbs' paper, since it raises a methodological question relevant to assessing evidence to be presented here. In his analysis of labelling theory, Gibbs demonstrates that the concepts used in the theory are ambiguous, since they are not defined denotatively, i.e., in a way