Why Gettier Cases Fail the Truth Condition

Abstract This paper proposes a logical resolution to the Gettier problem by re-evaluating the object of truth-value judgments. It argues that a conclusion is not a discrete entity but an extension of its derivation, forming an inseparable 'derivation-conclusion complex'. By analysing various Gettier-style counter-cases, it demonstrates that while the agent’s conclusion may notationally match a true one, the underlying derivation remains logically incompatible with the actual derivation process. Consequently, such cases fail to satisfy the truth condition, as the truth-value applies to the entire complex rather than the conclusion in isolation. This approach refutes the standard interpretation that Gettier cases involve true beliefs, thereby resolving the problem within the tripartite definition of knowledge without necessitating additional justification conditions. Keywords : Gettier problem, truth condition, derivation-conclusion complex, epistemic agent, tripartite definition of knowledge