ABSTRACT Cognitive overload can impair professional skepticism in high‐stakes contexts such as auditing. In these settings, sustaining professional skepticism is essential. Default nudges, or pre‐selected options, may offset these effects by reducing cognitive demands. We conducted an online pilot study followed by the main experiment to examine how cognitive load and default nudges influence professional skepticism in auditing decisions. A pilot study validated a dot memory task manipulation of cognitive load and identified low and high load conditions for the main experiment. The main experiment embedded this manipulation in the Phillips' audit task, used to measure professional skepticism in auditing. Results showed that cognitive load only slowed responses. However, default nudges accelerated responding and improved accuracy under load, but only when aligned with the most probable response; misaligned nudges reduced accuracy. These findings suggest that defaults act as conditional scaffolds under cognitive strain, supporting judgment and decision‐making in some contexts but introducing risks in others.
Erfanian et al. (Wed,) studied this question.