This paper examines the constitutional and statutory framework governing electoral dispute resolution in India, focusing on the balance between the plenary powers of the Election Commission under Article 324 and the bar on judicial interference under Article 329. Drawing on the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and key decisions such as N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer and Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, the paper analyses the doctrinal development of judicial restraint and post-election review through election petitions. It argues that while the constitutional design protects electoral continuity, delays in disposing of election petitions and procedural inefficiencies weaken the effectiveness of judicial remedies. The study proposes structural reforms, including specialized election tribunals and simplified procedures, to ensure that electoral justice remains timely, credible, and consistent with democratic legitimacy.
Jadhav et al. (Wed,) studied this question.