Research on the self often uses a single term—'self'—to denote several disparate processes that differ in function, timescale, and neural organization: embodied first-person presence, autobiographical self-organization, explicit self-evaluation, and metacognitive monitoring. For their separate analysis, the theory introduces two levels of self—minimal and narrative—two modes of functioning—action and reflection—and the transitional dynamics between them as a separate parameter of coordination. The minimal self defines the bodily-perspectival organization of current first-person experience and is associated with a distributed system of body-oriented processing, including the anterior precuneus, posteromedial regions, insula, and temporo-parietal systems. The narrative self defines the integration of current experience into autobiographical memory, personal continuity, and explicit self-knowledge and is associated with the coordinated involvement of default-mode, hippocampal, and prefrontal systems. The action mode corresponds to the organization of processing around current interaction with the environment; the reflection mode corresponds to states in which current or retrieved content becomes the object of explicit self-related and metacognitive processing. The theory posits expected clinical profiles as preferential, but not fully isolated, patterns of destabilization. Its validation requires establishing the partial differentiability of these components at the neural, behavioral, and clinical levels.
Ilya Tarasov (Thu,) studied this question.