Abstract In the great silence of which terminal disease, or the incurable pain, may well be the prelude, the Indian Constitution is asking us to consider one of the most personal questions of humanity: does the right to life in Article 21 apply to a noble decision to die as well? This essay critically examines the constitutionality of the so-called right to die with dignity, and how it has been developed over the years in the Supreme Court cases. Since the early swings of doctrine in Gian Kaur (1996), which strongly denied a general right to die, through the sympathetic but prudent approach adopted in Aruna Shanbaug (2011) and Common Cause (2018), the judiciary has increasingly come to understand that the real dignity requires more than a biological presence. The decision in Harish Rana v. Union of India (March 2026) was the first case in history where the Court allowed the removal of clinically assisted nutrition and hydration to a young man in a persistent vegetative state more than thirteen years, who made no effort to sustain his life by signing a living will. The ruling is not only operationalisation of the constitutional promise but also highlights the clash between personal autonomy and the solemn responsibility of the State to safeguard life. The paper discusses the ethical, philosophical, and practical dilemmas through a humanist prism: the danger of abuse in an heterogeneous society with socio-economic weaknesses, the long-standing legislative gap despite the frequent judicial prompting, and the more human need to reconcile the sanctity of life and the suffering of the unendurable. It contends that passive euthanasia is now a part of Article 21, but active euthanasia is still constitutionally unacceptable. Finally, the analysis recommends considerate legislation that respects life and dignified death, so that the constitutional values can be translated into benevolent reality of each citizen.
Vanshika Tainwala Silwanti kujur (Wed,) studied this question.