This preprint, The Adrenaline Reframe: Anxiety, Epinephrine, and the Failure of the Biomedical Model, presents a systematic theoretical challenge to the dominant disease model of anxiety. The article argues that what are classified as anxiety symptoms are fully explicable physiological effects of catecholamine activation, primarily epinephrine, and not indicators of an underlying pathological disorder. The central thesis is that anxiety is not a disease entity but a consequence of cognitive misinterpretation of normal bodily signals. The diagnostic label “anxiety” is proposed to function as a standing catastrophic interpretive frame, which sustains and amplifies symptom experience through memory encoding, semantic labeling, and anticipatory activation. The article integrates evidence from physiology, cognitive science, memory research, and regulatory documentation. A key contribution is the presentation of official freedom-of-information responses from the Danish Health Authority (December 2025), confirming the absence of biological markers, causal mechanisms, or validated correction models underlying current anxiety diagnoses and SSRI treatment frameworks. A complete one-to-one correspondence is demonstrated between DSM-based anxiety symptoms and known physiological effects of epinephrine, supporting the claim that all anxiety symptoms are biologically normal, time-limited, and self-terminating processes. Building on this, the article extends Clark’s cognitive misinterpretation model by identifying the diagnostic label itself as a core maintaining factor. Memory and language are analyzed as mechanisms through which initial misinterpretations become persistent, self-reinforcing cycles. The paper introduces a practical clinical implication: a brief psychoeducational triage intervention deliverable at first contact in primary care. This intervention replaces diagnostic labeling with a biologically accurate explanation of symptoms as adrenaline responses, aiming to interrupt the misinterpretation cycle before it becomes chronic. The work is conceptual and theory-driven, positioned within a falsifiable scientific framework. It does not claim empirical validation but proposes testable hypotheses and calls for controlled trials comparing this model with existing treatment paradigms. The article contributes a paradigm-level reinterpretation of anxiety, reframing it from a disorder requiring treatment to a misinterpreted physiological process requiring correct understanding.
Thomas Fogh Vinter (Tue,) studied this question.