Abstract Commercial space-based communications are reshaping national security around the world. In Nigeria, the shift is especially stark. Non-state actors, including terrorist groups and bandit networks, increasingly use commercial satellite services such as broadband satellite internet (for example, Starlink) and mobile satellite communications. They use these tools to plan and coordinate attacks, avoid detection, and keep operating in areas beyond the effective reach of terrestrial security forces. This paper assesses whether Nigeria’s current legal and regulatory framework is fit for purpose in responding to this emerging threat. Using a doctrinal methodology, it analyzes key statutes at the intersection of space policy, communications regulation, and counterterrorism: the National Space Research and Development Agency Act 2010 (NASRDA), the Defence Space Administration Act 2016 (DSA), the Nigerian Communications Act 2003 (NCA), and the Cybercrimes (Amendment) Act 2024 (CAA). It also draws practical lessons from recent security incidents involving satellite-enabled communications and evaluates how responsive Nigeria’s legal framework is in practice. The analysis identifies four interlinked gaps. First, a jurisdictional and extraterritoriality gap persists because communications laws remain largely territorial. They do not clearly or effectively extend regulatory authority to foreign-licensed satellite operators whose signals reach Nigeria, but who have no physical presence or registration in-country. Second, there is a capacity and mandate gap. The statutes empower space and defence institutions to deploy surveillance-related technologies, but they do not create enforceable funding mechanisms or workable procurement pathways. As a result, critical capabilities remain under-resourced and unrealised. Third, the statutes are largely silent on real-time data sharing between civilian space bodies (such as NASRDA) and military intelligence institutions (such as DSA). This entrenches institutional fragmentation and weakens the operational value of space-based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. Fourth, the roughly 15-year delay in implementing NASRDA’s regulatory and licensing mandate meant that commercial space communications remained effectively unregulated during a decisive period of technological diffusion. This gave security threats time to develop without oversight. The paper concludes that the central problem is not a total absence of law, but a deficit of legislative foresight and, crucially, implementation. Nigeria’s current statutes were designed for a state-centric space era and are poorly suited to regulating non-state exploitation, compelling foreign-operator compliance, or requiring inter-agency cooperation. The paper recommends urgent reforms to clarify extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign satellite services, establish binding intelligence-fusion and data-sharing mechanisms, and secure sustained funding for national-security space capabilities.
BABA et al. (Thu,) studied this question.