Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States.

For decades scholars have studied career patterns of elected officials, and, in a good many instances, after reading the results one admits the findings are interesting but is tempted to ask, So what? Too often there is little effort to show the significance of the evidence. But suppose someone were to collect biographical information on all holders of the office of governor and United States senator over a fifty-year period and then subject these data to intensive and imaginative analysis. Would that offer us any insights? Professor Schlesinger has done exactly that and the answer is definitely affirmative. Not only are the data collected in incredible volume, but almost every question that could be asked has been, and along the way some significant theory about American politics is derived. It is a book not easy to read, but well worth rereading. What are some of those insights? In the first place, he demonstrates that the degree of party competition in states is not as decisive a determining factor for career patterns as one might assume. The character of party organization and the constitutional structure and history of a state seem to be more decisive. Regional patterns are shown for the typical initial elective office and for the last office held before attaining senatorial or gubernatorial position. One can at least speculate about the place of the legislature in state politics by noting whether that institution is commonly among the stepping-stones to higher office in a state (it is a common stepping-stone in the South and in New England). He demonstrates variations in career patterns that apparently follow from party organizational differences, observing that the stronger the central party's control the less likely a regular order of succession will be observed. In short, Schlesinger provides an interesting corroboration of observations made by V. 0. Key and others about the impact of the party primary. The primary has had the effect of taking control over nominations out of the hands of party leaders and placing it in the hands of officeholders who use incumbency as a means to self-promotion. Perhaps the most interesting chapter is the one which develops theoretical points. The usual theory of two-party competition says that both parties will seek median ground in order to compete effectively.