Key points are not available for this paper at this time.
Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes 'Printsipy opredeleniya osnov vzaimootnoshenii mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatsiei i Chechenskoi Respublikoi', signed 31 August 1999, published in Nezavisimaya gazeta, 3 September 1996, p. 1. (Unless otherwise indicated, all Russian-language newspapers and periodicals cited here are published in Moscow.) The two sides signed a formal peace treaty in May 1997. There is a vast literature in several languages dealing with the 1994 – 96 war. Among the best accounts in English are Carlotta Gall Matthew Evangelista, The Chechen Wars:Will Russia Go the Way of the Soviet Union? (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2002), pp. 11 – 45; John B. Dunlop, Russia Confronts Chechnya: Roots of a Separatist Conflict (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998); Gail Lapidus, 'Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya', International Security, 23, 3, Summer 1998, pp. 5 – 49; and Tracey C. German, Russia's Chechen War (New York, Routledge Curzon, 2003). A large number of memoirs by Russian political leaders and military commanders who were involved in the first war have appeared over the past decade, and a small number of memoirs by Chechen officials who took part in the war — most notably Zelimhan Yandarbiev, Chechnya: Bitva za svobodu, 2 vols. (L'viv, Svoboda narodov, 1996) — have also been published. The Russian government sought to conduct a census in Chechnya in 2002 but outside observers found the results extremely unreliable. In mid-October 2002 the then prime minister of the pro-Russian Chechen government, Stanislav Il'yasov, announced that the census revealed a population of 1,088,816 in Chechnya, a much higher total than is generally accepted. Leading non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Russia, including the Memorial Human Rights Centre, have estimated that the current population of Chechnya is actually no more than 700,000. This figure tallies well with estimates by Médecins Sans Frontières (500,000), the Danish Refugee Council (675,000) and the United Nations (UN) Consolidated Appeal (650,000). It is also in accord with data compiled by the Validata opinion and marketing research firm (700,000), which was commissioned to do 11 republic-wide surveys in Chechnya (including a recalculation of the population) in February – December 2003. Aleksandr Cherkasov of Memorial has argued that deliberate falsification of the census results, by either the Russian government or the local Chechen government (or both), accounts for the large discrepancy between the official results and the estimated data. Similarly, the head of the Validata population count reported in July 2003 that he 'had not met a single Chechen who actually spoke to an official census-taker last year. Obviously, what happened is that local authorities filled in the census forms themselves and embellished the totals', quoted from Anatolii Kostyukov, 'U chechentsev est' mnenie: Nachalis' pervye sotsiologicheskie zamery nastroenii v respublike', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 30 July 2003, p. 1. For a fuller discussion of the population issue, see Norwegian Refugee Council, Global IDP Database, Protecting Internally Displaced Persons in the OSCE Area: A Neglected Commitment (Geneva and Oslo, Global IDP Project, October 2003), pp. 24 – 27. Aleksandr Raskin, 'Okruzhenie neulovimykh: Ob''yavivshiesya v Dagestane boeviki razbrelis' v raznye storony', Vremya novostei, 18 December 2003, p. 1. For a sobering overview of the effects of the war on everyday life in Chechnya see Médecins Sans Frontières, The Trauma of Ongoing War in Chechnya: Quantitative Assessment of Living Conditions and Psychosocial and General Health Status among the War-Displaced in Chechnya and Ingushetia (Amsterdam, MSF, August 2004). For a chilling account of the establishment and operation of these camps, see the recently declassified portions of a top secret US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report, `Intelligence Information Report deleted/Swift Knight — Usama Ben Laden's Current and Historical Activities', October 1998, released October 2004, through a Freedom of Information Act request. See also Valerii Tishkov, Obshchestvo v vooruzhenom konflikte: Etnografiya chechenskoi voiny (Moscow, Nauka, 2001), pp. 297 – 303. Important aspects of these incursions are still murky, and some analysts in both Russia and the West have argued that the raids were deliberately provoked by the Russian authorities. See for example Charles W. Blandy, Dagestan: The Storm Part I — The 'Invasion' of Avaristan (Sandhurst, UK, Conflict Studies Research Centre, March 2000); and Charles W. Blandy, Dagestan: The Storm Part 2 — The Federal Assault on the 'Kadar Complex' (Sandhurst, UK, Conflict Studies Research Centre, June 2000). The evidence is suggestive but not conclusive. For an illuminating assessment of this issue see Evangelista, The Chechen Wars, pp. 75 – 80. From the time these incidents occurred, they have been the subject of immense speculation in the West and in the Russian media. A good deal of troubling evidence has emerged about the possible culpability of the Russian security forces (presumably to create a pretext for a new war), but the case is not ironclad. For a summary of the main points of speculation, see Evangelista, The Chechen Wars, pp. 80 – 85. In hindsight it might appear that the Russian government had a lot to gain by starting a new war, but in the late summer of 1999 the possibility of suffering another fiasco (as in 1994 – 1996) must have weighed on the minds of policy makers. Outcomes that seem clear-cut in retrospect are often far more uncertain and ambiguous when the events are still happening. For detailed analyses of the military operations and defensive arrangements needed to gain and preserve control of major urban areas in Chechnya, see Captain Aleksei Plisov, 'Oborona goroda: Kogda kazhdyi dom – krepost', a ulitsa – bastion', Armeiskii sbornik, 2001,11, (November), pp. 31 – 36; and Colonel N. I. Kostyaev and Aleksandr Raskin Vladimir Gavrilov, 'Bezhentsy domoi', Trud, 10 June 2004, p. 2; and 'Palatochnykh gorodkov v Ingushetii bol'she net', Parlamentskaya gazeta, 9 June 2004, p. 1. On the earlier forced closings of Chechen refugee camps see Human Rights Watch, Into Harm's Way: Forced Return of Displaced People to Chechnya (New York, Human Rights Watch, January 2003); Human Rights Watch, Spreading Despair: Russian Abuses in Ingushetia (New York, HRW, September 2003); and Peter Baker, 'Forgotten Refugees Are Living "Like Bugs": Chechens Feel They Are Being Squeezed out of Nearby Region', The Washington Post, 19 October 2003, p. A18. These abuses have been documented by many outside governmental and non-governmental organisations, including the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the US State Department (in its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices), Human Rights Watch, and the Human Rights Center 'Memorial'. See for example Human Rights Watch, The "Dirty War" in Chechnya: Forced Disappearances, Torture, and Summary Executions (New York, HRW, March 2001); Human Rights Watch, Swept Under: Torture, Forced Disappearances, and Extrajudicial Killings During Sweep Operations in Chechnya (New York, HRW, February 2002); US Congress, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Democracy and Human Rights Trends in Eurasia and East Europe: A Decade of Membership in the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess., December 2002, p. 49; Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Situation in Chechnya: Briefing Paper to the 59th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights (New York, HRW, April 2003); Rachel Denber, ' "Glad to be Deceived": The International Community and Chechnya', in Human Rights Watch, World Report 2004: Human Rights and Armed Conflict (New York, HRW, 2004), pp. 121 – 139; Human Rights Center `Memorial', Chechnya 2004 god: Pokhishcheniya i ischeznoveniya lyudei (Moscow, Memorial, February 2005); Human Rights Center 'Memorial', Deceptive Justice: Situation on the Investigation of Crimes against Civilians Committed by Members of the Federal Forces in the Chechen Republic during Military Operations, 1999 – 2003 (Moscow, Memorial, May 2003); and 'Russia', in US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2003 (Washington, DC, Department of State, February 2004) Most of the sources adduced in the previous note also discuss the Chechen guerrillas' violations of human rights. Il'ya Maksakov, 'Ubiistvennaya statistika', Izvestiya, 19 February 2003, p. 1. See also Dmitrii Simakin, 'Smert' v rodnom tylu: Za tri "mirnykh" goda Rossiya poteryala nemnogim men'she soldat, chem za 9 let afganskoi voiny', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 21 February 2003, p. 1. Quoted from Vladimir Mukhin, 'Moskva uvelichivaet voiskuyu gruppirovku v Chechne: Pod shumok teraktov Genshtab podtyagivaet v myatezhnuyu respubliku poslednie rezervy', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 9 June 2003, p. 1. The latest official data, tabulated in 'Sravnitel'nyi analiz pomesyachnykh poter' v Chechne voennosluzhashchikh Minoborony, MVD, mestnoi militsii i naseleniya (na osnove ofitsial'noi informatsii)', Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 5, 13 February 2004, p. 8, suggest that only around 50 – 60 Russian soldiers were being killed each month in early 2000, but these figures omitted entire categories, producing figures for total deaths that are roughly half of what they should be. Estimates by the Union of Soldiers' Mothers Committees and other non-governmental organisations suggest a real figure of 100 – 150 a month for 2003 and the first half of 2004. See for example Vladimir Mukhin, 'Generaly raskroyut spiski: Minoborony priznalo neobkhodimost' publikatsii imen vsekh voennosluzhashchikh, pogibshikh v Chechne', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 6 November 2003, p. 4; and David Filipov, 'Russia's Unyielding Struggle: Attacks by Chechens Show Vulnerability', The Boston Sunday Globe, 10 August 2003, p. A4. A senior officer in the Russian military intelligence (GRU) spetsnaz forces, who is staunchly supportive of the campaign in Chechnya, estimated in late December 2003 that roughly 20% of the soldiers in his unit were being killed each year — an astonishingly high proportion if accurate; See the interview conducted by Vadim Udmantsev, ' "Mne nravitsya moya rabota": Spetsnaz GRU vypolnyaet v Chechne polovinu vsekh boevykh zadach', VPK — Voenno-promyshlennyi kur'er, No. 16, 24 – 30 December 2003, p. 5. Vladimir Mukhin, 'Lukavye tsifry Chechni: Ni voisk, ni boevikov ne stanovitsya men'she', Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 29, 6 August 2004, p. 2. See for example Ol'ga Allenova, 'Chechenskii OMON pochti v karmane: U Akhmata Kadyrova', Kommersant, 22 May 2003, p. 5. Denis Kozlov, 'Mir bez mira, voina bez pravil: Real'naya Chechnya ne pokhozha na to, chto my vidim po televizoru', Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 43, 5 December 2003, pp. 1, 5; and 'Chechenskie boeviki pytayutsya izmenit' taktiku i geografiyu terroristicheskoi deyatel'nosti', Agentstvo Voennykh Novostei, 1 April 2003. This point also was raised by many of the Russian MVD and Defence Ministry officials I interviewed in Moscow in December 2003 and June 2004. 'Za posobnichestvo boevikam zaderzhany militsionery', Severnaya Ossetia (Vladikavkaz), 21 August 2004, p. 1. Comments of Mikhail Lapotnikov, chief of the investigative bureau in the office of the procurator-general for the North Caucasus, cited in Vlad Trifonov, 'Ingushskie militsionery byly posobnikami Shamilya Basaeva', Kommersant, 24 September 2004, p. 5. Paul Quinn-Judge, 'No Way Out?', Time, 13 October 2003, p. 15. Among many similar accounts is Vadim Rechkalov, `Ideologiya Basaeva: Pochemu spetssluzhby ne mogut poimat' Shamilya Basaeva', Izvestiya, 14 December 2004, pp. 1 – 2 Even in 1999 most Chechens were dismayed when Basaev launched incursions into Dagestan that provoked new Russian attacks against Chechnya; see Evangelista, The Chechen Wars, pp. 68 – 69. Quoted in Captain Mikhail Sevast'yanov, 'Obustroistvo voisk v Chechne — eto nadolgo i vser'ez', Krasnaya zvezda, 2 November 1999, p. 1. Sergei Yastrzhembsky, who until March 2004 was Putin's chief spokesman on Chechnya, explained the president's policy as follows: 'Some Western politicians have been remarkably persistent in trying to discuss "alternative" means of resolving the Chechen problem. Yet all of these proposals, upon closer inspection, boil down to the same thing — negotiations with terrorists. That path, needless to say, is a dead end'. Yastrzhembsky went on to argue that 'certain forces in the West are not actually interested in regulating the situation in Chechnya' and 'are instead seeking to dissipate the positive political and psychological achievements' of Kadyrov's government. Cited in Andrei Pilipchuk, 'Stereotip "chernoi dyry" ', Krasnaya zvezda, 23 April 2003, p. 2. This point is stressed in Lieutenant-General Gennadii Kotenko, Major-General Ivan Vorob'ev see also Pavel Chernikov, 'Rossiya v tsifrakh', Kommersant-vlast', 19 April 2004, p. 12. The MVD figures, though exceedingly high, are less than half the number estimated by the Human Rights Center Memorial on the basis of reports from their field representatives. Russian press coverage of suicide bombings must be used with great caution. Part of the problem is the inherent uncertainty and confusion surrounding such events in the initial days after they occur; in addition, some Russian journalists have been wont to latch onto rumours and speculation without attempting to cross-check them. When discussing these events below I have relied only on accounts that have stood up over time. The precise name for the OGV varies in official publications, and it seems to have changed slightly over time. Occasionally it is referred to as the Unified Grouping of Federal Forces in the North Caucasus, and in a few cases the Russian word 'sil' rather than 'voisk' is used for what in English is rendered as 'forces'. When 'sil' is the for the is as rather than OGV some sources both to the For on the rationale for a of forces, see I. v Voennaya mysl', 2000, 3 – pp. – v Dagestane i Chechne: i Voennaya mysl', 2000, 3 pp. – and na i – Voennaya mysl', 2000, – pp. 5 – See the with in Aleksandr ' v ', kur'er, September 2003, p. 2; Andrei 'Chechnya 9 January 2004, pp. 1, 3; and ', Voenno-promyshlennyi kur'er, 14 January 2004, p. 3. po s na Rossiiskoi No. 30 June 2003, published in Rossiiskoi No. August 2003, part For on the of Russian see i i 2003, 3 pp. 5 – December 2003, when the then of the North Caucasus Military Valerii was from to the had been by a see Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 19 December 2003, p. 3. Aleksandr who was by in July 2004, is also a in Andrei Pilipchuk, Vladimir — i Krasnaya zvezda, October 2003, p. 1. with in Sergei i na Kommersant, 19 January 2004, p. On the see Ivan v Chechne Kommersant, 21 December 2004, p. The current of the GRU in the of is June 2004, when the Russian Putin's a on the of the Defence the GRU had been an of the Soviet and Russian General military intelligence was to the Soviet Information from September to January a by The in but not say, that the GRU to the minister rather than to the General During General that the of the General its control of the but some Russian and officials have argued See Dmitrii v Izvestiya, 30 June 2004, p. 3. For a though only of the vast number of the OGV and their areas of see boevikov na na Nezavisimaya 23 June 2004, p. 3. i v i No. 22 January 2004, pp. 3 – 5. This was all the more during the first year of the see for example to Russian Military The New York 3 April 2000, p. Colonel Gennadii voisk na 2 i — v vooruzhenom v Chechenskoi No. June 2004, p. 5. with Russian MVD December 2003 and June 2004. Cited in Vladimir it is in the Russian See the by Human Rights Watch, The of and of New in the Russian Armed Forces (New York, HRW, October 2004). Mikhail po v Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 5 October p. with Russian Forces who had from Chechnya in the of 2003, December 2003. See for example the interview with Colonel head of the Federal in the of Chechnya, by Aleksei and Ol'ga Allenova, No. 43, 1 November 2004, p. and Vladimir ', Gazeta, 19 December 2003, p. 2. Abrashin, 'Teraktov v Ingushetii i Beslane mozhno bylo ne dopustit", pp. 1, 3. Quoted in Sergei v ne gazeta, 24 June 2004, p. 2. See for example i v pp. 3 – 5; and Major-General I. N. boevykh Voennaya mysl', 1 – pp. – Vadim Rechkalov, s do 100 a voiny ne Izvestiya, 2 August 2004, p. 1. Comments of General in Armeiskii sbornik, 2000, 6 p. Pilipchuk, Vladimir p. 1. with in Vladimir ' za — U Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 December p. For on the of the Russian military as of 2004, see Aleksandr let (Moscow, 2004). Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 29, 6 August 2004, p. 5. with in & na p. 1. Aleksandr voisk Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 13 August 2004, p. Comments of General in p. See for example Evgenii v Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, No. 13 – 19 October 2000, p. with Forces June 2004. Quoted in v Krasnaya zvezda, 6 February 2004, p. 1. was much more see the interview with in ' gde ', Krasnaya zvezda,
Mark Kramer (Tue,) studied this question.