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Abstract As the melting of the Arctic ice accelerates, China is wasting no time in reshaping its Arctic policies with more resources devoted to Arctic research and politics. Despite China's open statement of not having a strategic agenda regarding the melting Arctic, it is increasingly evident that the rising power, through shrewd diplomacy, generous investment packages, frequent expeditions and enhanced polar research capacities, is devoting more national resources in a coherent way to securing its long-term geopolitical influence and economic interest in the Arctic. Due to its limited impact upon the current Arctic affairs, China has to adopt a low-profile tactic through avoiding confrontation from major littoral states, in accordance with basic principles that guide virtually every relevant aspect of its national grand strategy in the post-cold war era. Since China's emerging Arctic strategy is a component of its maritime strategy, which itself is part of the country's grand strategy, there is no wonder that its Arctic strategy and grand strategy are analogical in terms of guidelines and ultimate goals to be achieved. Keywords: Chinagrand strategyArctic politicsclimate changenatural resourcesshipping routeslittoral states Acknowledgements The author would like to thank Dr. Stig Stenslie, Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, for his insightful comments. Notes 1Hu Zhengyue, Chinese assistant minister of foreign affairs, has said "China does not have an Arctic strategy" while attending an Arctic forum organized by the Norwegian Government on Svalbard in June 2009. See Jakobson, "China Prepares," 1. 2Malte Humpert and Andreas Raspotnik have argued against prevailing perceptions that geoeconomics plays a predominant role in China's Arctic endeavour, saying that the driving force instead is based on geopolitical considerations, including enhancing its ability to exert influence in the Arctic through regional strategic partnerships. Humpert and Raspotnik, "Great Wall," 1. 3See, e.g. Swaine and Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy; Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge; Ye, "The Imperative for China," 5–10. 4Brady, "Polar Stakes," 11. 7Kennedy, Grand Strategies, 5. 5Clausewitz, On War, 127–32. 6Hart, Strategy, 322. 8Swaine and Tellis, Interpreting China's Grand Strategy, xi–x. 9Friedberg, Contest for Supremacy, 143–58. 10Wang, "China's Search for a Grand Strategy," 68–79. 11Ibid. 12Ibid. 13Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge, 17. 14Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), Snow, Water, 4. 15Grupta, "Geopolitical Implications", 30. 16Bockmann, "Arctic Ship Cargoes." 17Bertelsen, "China Watches." 18Gautier et al., "Assessment of Undiscovered Oil." 19ECON, "Arctic Shipping 2030," 4–5. 20Brady, "Polar Stakes," 12. 21Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA), "Welcome to CAA website." 22Ibid. 23Xinhua News, "China's New Icebreaker;" Brady, "Polar Stakes," 12. 24BBC News, "China's Huang Nubo." 25Friedberg, Contest for Supremacy, 144. 26The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence or Panchsheel were jointly put forth by China and India in 1950s as norms of relations between nations. The five principles, which include mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence, have become the formal guidelines for China's foreign policy since then. 27Jakobson, "China Prepares," 11. 28Man, "China Vies." 29Jakobson, "China Prepares," 10. 30Campbell, "China and the Arctic," 3. 31The Monroe Doctrine, often summarized in the phrase of "America for the Americans", is a policy of the USA in the ninth century that stated that further efforts by European nations to colonize land or interfere with states in North or South America would be viewed as acts of aggression requiring US intervention. Outlook Weekly,"Coping with Challenges," 72. 32Ming, "Breaking the Ice." 33Li, "Obstacles to China's Participation," 98–102; Han, "Sovereign Disputes in the Arctic," 16–9. 34See Hao, "Influence of Societal Factors," 1–18. 35Glaser and Medeiros, "The Changing Ecology," 291. 36As the undisputed leader of CCP and founder of the People's Republic of China, Mao Zedong decided China's foreign strategies according to his own understanding of world politics and his personality. Although Deng Xiaoping, the general architect of China's reform and opening policy, still had the final say on foreign policy making, he became more consultative with his Politburo colleagues due to less political authority compared with Mao. Jiang Zemin was more consensually oriented than Deng and Hu Jintao is the most consensual and consultative among all paramount CCP leaders. 37See Bachman, "Structure and Process," 34–54. 38For example, see Lampton, The Making of Chinese; Hao and Su, China's Foreign Policy. 39Jakobson and Knox, "New Foreign Policy," 1. 40Interview with foreign policy insider from Beijing, Singapore, 27 July 2010. The three oil giants are the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). 41Downs, "Business Interest Groups," 121–41. 42See Zweig and Jianhai, "China's Global Hunt," 25–38. 43There have been discussions among China watchers about the possible existence of "petroleum faction" in the country's elite politics. See Becquelin, "Zhu Rongji's Oil Men," 9; Fewsmith, "China's Response" and Li and White, "Sixteenth Central Committee," 553–97. 44Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA), "Welcome to CAA website." 45China Institute for Marine Affairs (CIMA) (haiyang fazhan zhanlue yanjiusuo) under the SOA, in cooperation with other research institute and universities, is formulating China's marine strategy as part of its grand strategy. 46AFP News, "Despite Nobel." 47 The Economist, "Chinese Oil Firm in Canada," 56. 48Friedberg, Contest for Supremacy, 144, 156–7. 49China's State Council, "12th National Five-Year Plan." 50Jakobson, "China Prepares," 4. 51Brady, "Polar Stakes," 14.
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