While theory casts family firms as long-term stewards, rising global demands for sustainability create a practical conflict: unique family goals often clash with formal institutional expectations, leaving the true nature of their corporate social responsibility disputed. This tension motivates this investigation into how family ownership shapes the strategic divergence between substantive and symbolic ESG performance. Analyzing over 4000 public companies across twenty-seven countries, I identify a unique reputational caution model of governance. Empirical results reveal a consistent management lag—family firms systematically underperform in social initiatives and ESG management quality compared to non-family counterparts. Robustness checks using instrumental variable and endogenous treatment models confirm a significant measurement deficit, showing that family firms are less likely to track scope 1 and 3 emissions. These findings reveal a strategic divergence: despite higher emissions under concentrated control, family firms avoid greenwashing and non-compliance. Socioemotional wealth acts as a reputational floor, where the high affective cost of scandal deters active deception. This pattern persists across legal origins and is pronounced in weak macro-governance environments. Ultimately, family-firm ESG behavior is driven by avoidance of negative signaling rather than proactive stewardship.
Viviana Fernandez (Mon,) studied this question.