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Abstract This article suggests that the development of the European Security and Defence Policy has not only signalled a new tempo in EU policy making but seems also to have unforeseen consequences in that it pushes forward the development of the EU's internal security policy. The link is visible most clearly in the crisis management capabilities that have been built up with external operations in mind, but that, once established, have been perceived as having internal utility. It is argued in this article that it is comparatively much easier to develop such capacities in the field of external relations and that the development of capacities, in turn, leads to the need for more shared strategic thinking. Bridging internal and external security is not friction–free, however; in particular, different views on the relative competences of the EU Council and the Commission make it more difficult. Yet, there are encouraging signs of increasingly holistic security thinking emerging within the EU. Key Words: European UnionESDPcrisis managementcivil protectionsecurity Notes 1. There are terminological difficulties related to the concepts of 'security' and 'crisis management'. The ESDP's role abroad is described consistently as relating to security, with crisis management missions contributing towards that goal. The same can be said for internal matters: security is a broad concept, while crisis management capacities contribute towards the goal of a 'secure' Europe. The concept of an EU 'protection space' that encompasses both internal and external security aspects is a useful concept (see Introduction to this issue) that obviates some of the above difficulties, but still leaves us with the practical issues of who does what. 2. Indeed, they were further broadened in the proposed Constitutional Treaty to include joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance to third countries, conflict prevention and post–conflict stabilization. 3. Almost all member countries participate, even though the original idea in the draft constitutional treaty was that this would be an activity for a core group of most willing and most capable countries only. 4. The acrimonious debates in the Dutch parliament in February 2006 over whether to send Dutch soldiers to the south of Afghanistan to support NATO operations also illustrates that endless requests for NATO (or EU) assistance, especially for more dangerous operations, will elicit careful scrutiny. 5. As is well known, the proposed Constitutional Treaty for Europe would have nominally abolished the pillar structure and, according to proponents, brought a new coherence and coordination to EU policies. 6. The tasks were adopted initially in 1992 by the Western European Union. This was the same year that Boutros Boutros Ghali, the UN Secretary General, unveiled his Agenda for Peace which included the term "peace enforcement". The term was felt by some WEU members to be too 'muscular' and the term 'peacemaking' was preferred since it not only sounded more neutral and traditional in peacekeeping terms, but also left the question of how muscular the EU member states might be prepared to be as an open issue. 7. Definitions at http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/prevention/definition.htm. 8. Although even here highly subjective assessments of what constitutes crisis management may apply since, arguably, much of the Community's external activities has a stabilization effect. 9. Action brought on 21 February by the European Commission against the Council of the European Union, Case C–91/05, Official Journal of the European Union, C115/10, 14 May 2005. At the time of writing the outcome of the SALW case is unknown, but it will be a landmark decision since it may help establish much–needed benchmarks for other grey areas. The ruling will be all the more important since any adoption of the constitutional treaty by the member states, which would have obviated some (but not all) of these tensions, is likely to be beyond the life of the Barroso Commission. 10. These are: earthquakes and tsunamis; forest fires and other fires; floods and landslides; industrial and nuclear accidents; terrorist attacks; disasters at sea; and pandemics. 11. An intermediary step is the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) which, from 20 October 2005, makes assets available to the participating states on the basis of allocated flight hours over a 72–hour period (2,000 in total). France has already announced that its flight hours under the contract would be allocated to priority EU usage. 12. The mechanism can also be used to support ESDP crisis management operations. It has been activated in Central Europe (2002), France (2003), the Prestige accident (2002), Algeria (2003), Iran (2003), Morocco (2004), Portugal (2004) and Asunción (2004). Curiously the ESDP civil protection mechanism, which can draw on the Community mechanism, is nevertheless separate (see Ekengren & Rhinard (this issue) for more on the Community's civil protection capacities). 13. Strict and clear guidelines are laid down in international law guiding the use of military and civil defence assets in humanitarian operations. Thus, although there may be scope for further discussion about how military assets may contribute to specific humanitarian operations, the parameters within which they operate must be respected. The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (often called the Oslo Guidelines) and the UN Guidelines on the Use of MCDA in Complex Emergencies (2003) are the primary applicable rules.
Duke et al. (Mon,) studied this question.