Prolonged downturns in the global economy have simultaneously increased banks’ credit risk exposures and intensified the need for effective liquidity management. This study develops a dynamic agent-based financial network comprising banks, depositors, firms, and the central bank to examine trade-offs in bank resolution under coupled liquidity and credit risks from the perspective of systemic stability. The simulation results show that, for liquidity risk management, when banks adopt the asset-sale strategy, both default probability and expected returns in the banking system exhibit a nonlinear pattern: they first decline and then rise as the asset depreciation ratio increases. Furthermore, at moderate levels of asset depreciation, the asset-sale strategy helps preserve heterogeneity within the banking system, thereby preventing excessive risk concentration, and performs better than the liability-expansion strategy. Regarding credit risk resolution, the debt-relief strategy significantly improves systemic stability, whereas the effectiveness of the debt-extension strategy depends critically on liquidity management conditions. Under liability-expansion scenarios, default risk initially declines but later rises as debt maturity is extended, whereas expected returns move in the opposite direction. Under asset-sale conditions, the debt-extension strategy enhances systemic stability only when the allowable number of debt extensions is sufficiently high. The analysis of strategic trade-offs indicates that combining the debt-relief strategy with the asset-sale strategy generates a positive synergistic effect and strengthens systemic resilience, whereas the interaction between the debt-extension and asset-sale strategies produces offsetting effects. These findings offer useful implications for banks and regulators in designing coordinated and adaptive frameworks for risk resolution and systemic stability.
Gao et al. (2026) studied this question.