Self‐selection or Socialization? A Dynamic Analysis of Committee Member Preferences

Theories on committee power assert that legislators self‐select to committees and therefore have preferences regarding the policy issues under the committees' jurisdictions that differ from the preferences of noncommittee members. I argue that preference outliers may be shaped both by processes of self‐selection and by endogenous processes within committees. Contrary to previous examinations of committee member preferences, the study utilizes a dynamic approach to examine the development of preferences over time in order to separate self‐selection from endogenous processes. Analyzing the development in the spending preferences of 859 Danish local politicians over three different election periods, I find that politicians increasingly prefer spending on their committees' jurisdictions over time, but their preferences do not change to the same extent on policy issues beyond their committees' jurisdictions. The findings point to the importance of endogenous processes in committees. Hence, committees may be outliers for very different reasons than those proposed by mainstream theory.