Revisiting making crime: the broken chain of security

This article critically examines the making crime process within anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) frameworks in Switzerland and Canada, through the analytical lens of the ‘chain of security’. By deconstructing the mechanisms of suspicion production by reporting entities and the role of financial intelligence units (FIUs), we highlight how the governance of (il)licit financial flows reveals a diversity of mechanisms and frameworks that deviate from the linearity perceived by the chain model. Our analysis reveals that, contrary to the theoretical assumptions of intelligence-led policing, the AML/CFT system operates through a selective process in which suspicion is often transferred rather than actively detected. Law enforcement actors maintain control over the ‘making crime’ process by leveraging financial intelligence in ways that reinforce pre-existing investigative priorities, rather than uncovering new criminal behaviours. This study challenges dominant conceptualisations of financial security governance and underscores the need to rethink the role of financial intelligence in shaping crime definitions and enforcement strategies.