Previous work has proposed that worldhood concerns the conditions under which reality becomes organized as an inhabitable world rather than a mere collection of physical processes, representations, or informational states. More recently, significance has been identified as a fundamental threshold in this process. A world emerges not simply because differences exist, but because some differences matter more than others. The present paper investigates a further question. If significance constitutes a necessary condition of worldhood, what additional conditions are required before a world can exist at all? The inquiry seeks to identify the minimum architecture capable of sustaining an inhabitable world. The analysis proceeds by examining several candidate conditions. Significance is argued to be necessary because worldhood requires relevance and orientation. Temporality is examined as the condition through which significance acquires continuity. Perspective is explored as the condition through which significance becomes organized relative to a center of orientation. The paper then investigates horizon formation and argues that horizon is not an independent condition alongside the others, but the first manifestation of worldhood itself. Once meaningful distinctions persist through time and become organized relative to a perspective, reality opens beyond what is immediately present as a structured field of possibilities. The paper proposes a provisional architecture of minimal worldhood consisting of significance, temporality, and perspective. Together these conditions generate horizon, through which reality becomes organized as an inhabitable world. The result is not presented as a final theory but as a framework for future investigations into animal, plant, artificial, collective, and altered forms of worldhood.
Erik Tönsberg (Mon,) studied this question.