This paper argues that the hard problem of consciousness as formulated by David Chalmers does not constitute a genuine problem but an epistemologically self-contradictory framing. The central argument is as follows: every intellectual formulation concerning the relationship between physical processes and subjective experience is constructed from within experience itself. The only being that could legitimately formulate Chalmers's dilemma—that is, from a standpoint external to experience—would be precisely the philosophical zombie Chalmers postulates. But Chalmers is not, and cannot be, a zombie. Consequently, his question is not formulated from where it purports to be formulated. It is further shown that the philosophical zombie is not a neutral hypothesis but a fiction tailored to produce exactly the explanatory gap Chalmers wishes to demonstrate, making his argument a concealed instance of question-begging. The paper also examines a more modest version of the argument—based on a mere descriptive asymmetry between physical description and experience—and shows that this version, which Chalmers did not formulate, would not generate a hard problem but a trivial epistemological observation. The paper situates its contribution in relation to relevant prior work, in particular Marcus (2004) and Dennett (1991), and specifies in what respect the argument here developed is distinct and more radical. It also draws on the thesis that consciousness consists in the capacity to objectify one's own thought (Iguiniz Agesta, 2026a).
Gabriel Iguiniz Agesta (Sat,) studied this question.