The rapid growth of the sharing economy has improved resource utilization in car-sharing, yet it has also sharpened market competition and diversified user demand. A persistent obstacle is the low coordination efficiency between asset-heavy operating companies and traffic-driven platforms, whose misaligned objectives waste social resources. This paper uses differential game theory to analyze their dynamic coordination strategies and benefit allocation mechanisms. The Nerlove–Arrow model captures the evolution of brand goodwill, while the company’s decisions on station layout, vehicle dispatch, and pricing, together with the platform’s advertising investment, form the core decision variables in a two-party game framework linking the asset side and the traffic side. Compared with the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, the cooperative mode removes the double marginalization effect, strengthens the investment incentives of both parties, and raises the system’s steady-state goodwill and total profit, achieving a Pareto improvement. To ground the cooperative framework in rigorous theory, we supply a verification theorem confirming that the linear candidate value functions satisfy the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equations over the entire admissible state space. A formal proof of instantaneous rationality ensures that neither party falls into a cooperation trap on the horizon 0,T, and the asymptotic stability of the steady-state goodwill trajectory is established. We further endogenize the revenue-sharing coefficient through a generalized Nash bargaining model that admits asymmetric bargaining structures, and introduce a Stackelberg leadership benchmark as a third comparative regime. Sensitivity analyses with respect to the discount rate and user heterogeneity confirm the robustness of the findings. A dedicated discussion section bridges the gap between idealized parameterization and data-driven calibration, describing practical pathways via A/B testing, user churn metrics, and econometric estimation of demand parameters. The results offer a scientific decision-making reference for strategic cooperation in the car-sharing industry.
Jiang et al. (Mon,) studied this question.