Current ontological security research privileges the power of elites as maintainers of ontological security narratives, which I define as autobiographical narratives that encompass how people see themselves, which informs their identities and interests (Subotić 2015, Lupovici 2012, Mitzen 2006). This research project seeks to contest the monopoly state elites have in shaping ontological security narratives, by proposing a theory that explains why and how public actors can sometimes construct competing "derivative" ontological security narratives that deviate from the ones state elites want to establish, and in doing so, force a change in the state's foreign policy actions. This theory focuses on two factors — the presence of trauma and public access to memory construction tools — as key conditions that alter power dynamics between political elites and non-elite (public) actors in instating their desired derivative ontological security narrative. This paper uses China as a case study to illustrate this theory. Specifically, I will analyze changes in Chinese autobiographical narratives, where in contrast to the pre-1990s era, the Chinese state was decreasingly able to instate a victor-centered derivative narrative, as factions of the Chinese public constructed a victim-centered (trauma-centered) derivative narrative, in doing so, instigating widespread anti-Japanese protests that compelled the Chinese government to change their foreign policy approach to Japan. The theory, along with the Chinese case study, suggest that as non-elites acquire more control over memory construction tools, their capacity to construct and instate derivative ontological security narratives may increase.
Hannah Ni (2024) studied this question.