Representation in Democratic Athens: Manin’s Principles Revisited

In The Principles of Representative Government (1997), Bernard Manin argues that the means of selection, elections producing representative democracy and drawing lots applied in direct democracy, create fundamentally different kinds of government. I argue that Manin's typology holds firm, but that it needs some modification. First, Daniela Cammack's analysis of the Athenian system for the impact of ‘interest' and ‘accountability' reveals representative elements within the Athenian direct democracy, further clarified with the distinction between ‘synecdochical' (part-for-the-whole) and ‘metaphorical' (transformed) representation as defined by Frank Ankersmit. Next, with these parameters, I investigate the multiple offices (archai) at Athens. In the selection of officials, a significant turn occurs from the means and conditions (synecdoche) to the outcome (metaphor), rendering the difference between allotted offices and elected ones arguably one of degree, rather than of kind. This inquiry further suggests that archē, the right to act with authority over one’s fellow citizens, holds by its very nature an element of representational distance and inequality that even drawing lots from all with high rotation cannot fully undo. This insight is relevant to any analysis of drawing lots for office in a political system in other historical periods as well as today.