This article directly challenges the foundational premise of the modern free-will debate: the assumption that universal determinism is an established scientific fact. It argues that philosophy has blindly inherited Laplacian determinism from the Newtonian era, forcing it to invent "compatibilism" to save moral responsibility. The paper demonstrates that this rescue mission is scientifically obsolete. Key arguments driving the paper: Physics Does Not Support Determinism: Quantum indeterminacy is not "washed out" at the macroscopic level. Through deterministic chaos, microscopic uncertainty is exponentially amplified to human scales in a matter of seconds. The Brain is Physically Unpredictable: Thermal and quantum fluctuations are embedded directly in the causal machinery of neural action potentials. The exact future of a human decision is fundamentally open, not predetermined since the Big Bang. Compatibilism is Outdated: Compatibilism is a semantic salvage operation designed for 18th-century physics. Redefining freedom merely as a "lack of external coercion" ignores the real metaphysical question of authorship. Responsibility Without Metaphysical "Free Will": We do not need to prove absolute metaphysical "authorship" to justify justice. The paper introduces a prospective, causal model of responsibility: agents are held accountable because consequences and sanctions physically alter the probability of their future behavior. Worldviews are Causal Actors: Belief in determinism versus agency is not a neutral observation; it is a physical cause. The worldview a society adopts actively shapes human behavior, constructs societal institutions, and drives psychiatric realities (e.g., learned helplessness). The paper concludes by proposing "Open Agency": a framework that accepts genuine physical uncertainty, rejects the pre-written script of the universe, and grounds moral responsibility in empirical reality rather than unverifiable metaphysical speculation.
Julian Zoria (Mon,) studied this question.