Traditional antitrust analysis relies heavily on static concentration metrics (HHI), which often fail to capture the asymmetric pricing incentives inherent in digital platform markets. To address this limitation, a calibrated structural merger simulation is utilized to demonstrate how incorporating idiosyncratic firm features complements traditional screens in evaluating dynamic unilateral effects. This methodological approach is applied to a watershed empirical context: the multi-billion-dollar bidding war for Warner Bros. Discovery. A counterfactual “Dominant Firm Acquisition” (Netflix and HBO Max, capturing ~40% of the market) is contrasted against the agreed-upon “Secondary Competitor Acquisition” (HBO Max and Paramount+, ~10%). Findings reveal a fundamental asymmetry. The market-leader acquisition is projected to generate a unilateral price increase of 2.24% alongside a severe concentration spike (HHI +422 points). Conversely, the secondary competitor consolidation yields a minimal structural impact (+49 points) and a lower projected price increase (+0.92%). Ultimately, the analysis indicates that the primary antitrust risk in zero-marginal-cost streaming ecosystems lies not merely in immediate pricing pressure, but in the aggregate extraction of consumer surplus and the creation of irreversible market dominance.
Athanasios Papathanasopoulos (Sun,) studied this question.