ABSTRACT This paper explores why a group of Global South middle powers has adopted stances on the Ukrainian war that diverged from the positions of the United States under President Joe Biden, the European Union and the broader NATO/Western alliance. I claim that these disparities are partially explained by the affiliation these states have with the notion of non‐alignment that has been re‐signified in the context of the conflict in Ukraine. I argue that ‘non‐alignment’ has, over the years, provided postcolonial states with a sense of common purpose and ontological security. This was done through a set of institutionalised practices and narratives anchored on principles such as autonomy, anti‐Western colonialism and equality that provided them with a sense of identity in the unstable context of the Cold War conflict and beyond. The claim, therefore, is that these states' positions are not necessarily related to developments in the war itself, and the undeniable fact of Russia's aggression. Instead, they are rooted in a sense of ontological (in)security and historical resentment towards the exclusions and hierarchies of the Western‐led international order. I engage with the cases of India, Brazil and South Africa as representative democratic middle powers and leaders in the Global South.
Marco Antonio Vieira (Thu,) studied this question.