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During the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829, which became the final stage of the Eastern crisis provoked by the Greek struggle for independence, the imperial cabinet perceived France as a potential support against the hostility of England and Austria.Appointed ambassador to Russia, general Casimir de Mortemart, was instructed to join emperor Nicholas I on the Balkan front in May 1828.He remained there five months and wrote 32 dispatches, hardly considered by historians to this day.Mortemart did not limit himself to mere observation, but also comments as an officer upon the miscalculations of the high command, which in the end deceived the hopes of the French government for a quick Russian victory over Turkey.He misses Napoleonic audacity in the conduct of operations.Moreover, he came to doubt the real forces and resources of the "northern colossus", and warned his government against too many illusions.As a diplomat he takes a stronger view than his own government on the opportunity to support Russia against the British claim of a separation between the Balkan issue and the Greek one.Such an ambassador, who appears both as a would-be general-in-chief of the Russian army and would-be French minister of foreign affairs cannot but provide a specially interesting testimony.
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