Abstract I examine Fiona Cunningham's Under the Nuclear Shadow: China's Information-Age Weapons in International Security. The central puzzle of Cunningham's excellent book is how China responded to the 1995–1996 Third Taiwan Crisis by developing offensive cyber operations, counterspace capabilities, and precision conventional missiles. Cunningham argues that these capabilities served as China's answer to what she calls its “limited-war dilemma”—enabling it to credibly engage in a conflict below the nuclear threshold in which its conventional capabilities lagged the United States. I examine Cunningham's argument through three analytical lenses: the theorist, the China watcher, and the policymaker. I show the value of her theory and its applicability to a range of theoretical debates, such as around cyber coercion. I praise the depth and breadth of her research, which offers significant insight into the Chinese military and leadership. I argue that the book is naturally constrained by sourcing in its implications for policymakers, but there is, nonetheless, substantial value. Although the book's comprehensive approach may be daunting for those readers who prefer a more narrow frame, it is a remarkable accomplishment.
A Thu, study studied this question.